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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was the evidence presented by the State sufficient to prove an 
intentional burning and that the defendant was responsible for 
the burning? 
2. Was the Appellant denied his right to effective assistance of 
counsel because of counsel's failure to object to evidence 
seized in a warrantless search and because of counsel's 
misunderstanding of the rules of evidence which deprived the 
appellant of his right to testify? 
iii. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. 
JAMES ACE MOREHOUSE, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 860193-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment against James Ace 
Morehouse for the offense of Aggravated Arson, a Second Degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-103 (1986 Supp.). A 
jury found the defendant guilty following a trial which occurred on 
April 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, and 10, 1986, in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 1, 1985, around 8:00 p.m., a fire broke out at 
a service station at 400 East 300 South in Salt Lake City. The 
station was leased and operated by Appellant James Morehouse (R. 
579-80). The fire department responded, extinguished the fire, 
conducted a preliminary investigation and left the premises around 
10:05 p.m. (R. 210). The fire department was again summoned to the 
premises around 11:00 p.m. to extinguish a second fire (R. 217). 
Following investigations of the fire, Appellant Morehouse was 
arrested and charged with aggravated arson (R. 18-19). 
At trial, Lt. Mauerman, the fire department official in 
charge of the fire crew dispatched to the service station, testified 
for the State. Lt. Mauerman stated that based on his experience in 
the field and his special training, he believed the first fire was 
the result of a faulty electrical system (R. 210-12). He testified 
that the second fire appeared to involve flammable substances (R. 
219). Lt. Memmott, an origin and cause specialist was called to the 
second fire. At trial, he testified for the State and concluded 
that the fires were not caused by the electrical system (R. 303) but 
resulted from flammable liquids (R. 319). He based his conclusions 
on personal investigations of the premises following the fire. Mr. 
Memmott relied on burn patterns (R. 304), pictures he had taken 
following the fire (R. 322), and samples of material taken from the 
premises and examined by the State Crime Lab (R. 307-14). The 
evidence obtained through these apparently warrantless searches was 
never challenged by defendant's attorney, Mr. Verhoef. 
An expert in fires and explosives from the University of 
Utah Research Institute, Wayne Ursonback, testified for the defense 
that based on his experience and training, the fire started in a 
junction box in the ceiling and ignited flammable materials in the 
ceiling space above the office (R. 855). Mr. Ursonback based his 
testimony on burn patterns, smoke deposits (R. 842), pictures taken 
following the fire (R. 828), personal investigations of the 
premises, and fire reports (R. 855). 
At trial, Mr. Morehouse was prevented from testifying in 
his own behalf due to his attorney's misunderstanding of the Utah 
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Rules of Evidence (R. 1084-86). The attorney, Mr. Verhoef, 
testified in a later proceeding that at the time of trial he 
believed that if Mr. Morehouse testified, the prosecution would then 
be able to impeach him because of previous felony convictions (R. 
1085). However, it was argued at the post-trial proceeding that 
Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows for a balancing of the 
probative value against the prejudicial effect and prevents any 
inquiry concerning convictions or sentences served more than ten 
years previously (R. 1130). Further, defense counsel argued that 
Rule 609 would have prevented the prosecution from impeaching Mr. 
Morehouse based on his prior record (R. 1086). However, at trial a 
motion to allow Mr. Morehouse to testify was never made due to 
counsel's erroneous application of the rules and, thus, Mr. 
Morehouse was effectively prevented from testifying in his own 
defense. 
At trial other witnesses testified to Mr. Morehouse's 
activities on the evening of November 1st. Steve Regan, the owner 
of the station, and police detective Clegg both testified that Mr. 
Morehouse told them he had closed his station between 7:00 and 7:30 
p.m. and went directly to the Batters Up Club (R. 441, 585). 
Witnesses at the club testified that Mr. Morehouse was at the club 
on the evening of November 1, 1986, but differed on their 
recollections of when he left (R. 618, 656). However, Shirley 
Morehouse, appellant's wife, and Steve Regan both testified that 
they telephoned Mr. Morehouse at home shortly after 8:30 p.m. (R. 
752, 582-83). 
After the fire department had extinguished the first fire, 
Mr. Morehouse remained at the station awaiting the return of his 
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partner, Bill Molise, who was planning to spend the night at the 
station to guard against vandalism (R. 216, 525). Mr. Molise 
testified that he and Mr. Morehouse took a flashlight and went into 
the station to retrieve the money from the register (R. 532). Mr. 
Molise testified that Mr. Morehouse knocked the register off the 
counter (R. 532). Later Mr. Morehouse's watch was found underneath 
the register and the debris from the second fire. Mr. Molise left 
Mr. and Mrs. Morehouse at the station while he collected some things 
to spend the night at the station (R. 534). 
Mrs. Morehouse testified that she and her husband got tired 
of waiting for Mr. Molise and went looking for him. Upon returning 
to the station they saw another car pull out of the opposite 
entrance (R. 766). Mrs. Morehouse's testimony concerning the car 
was confirmed by Mrs. Slattery who lived across the street from the 
station. She provided a detailed description of an individual she 
saw standing in front of the gas station office (R. 627-28) and 
later saw leaving with his car headlights off. 
Mrs. Morehouse also testified that while she and Mr. 
Morehouse were waiting outside the station in their car, another car 
drove up to the pumps (R. 767). Individuals got out of the car, 
tried to get gas from the pumps, approached the office window, 
returned to the car and drove away quickly. The next minute the 
second fire broke out (R. 767). The Morehouses were able to get the 
license plate number of the second car which they gave to the police 
officer investigating the fire, Officer Clegg. (R. 768). An 
investigation revealed that the car in question had been stolen and 
had been involved in other criminal incidents that night (R. 456). 
- 4 -
Finally, Harry Beaslin, Mr, Morehouse's insurance agent 
testified that Mr. Morehouse had taken out a "garage keeper's" 
policy insuring the contents of the garage in April of 1985 (R. 
500). On November fourth Mr. Morehouse notified Mr. Beaslin of the 
fire and resulting minor loss, according to the terms of the 
insurance policy (R. 499). The following morning Mr. Morehouse 
again contacted Mr. Beaslin to advise him that due to the fact that 
the damage was minor he had elected to withdraw the claim (R. 499). 
Mr. Regan, the owner of the building, testified that he had 
attempted to recover on Mr. Morehouse's insurance (R. 596). 
Following a trial Mr. Morehouse was convicted of Aggravated 
Arson and sentenced on April 1, 1986. On April 21, 1986, Mr. 
Verhoef, appellant's trial attorney, filed a motion for a new trial 
on the basis of a Utah Supreme Court decision, State v. Banner, 
which was issued on April 14, 1986. At a hearing on the motion, Mr. 
Verhoef testified that the decision illuminated his 
misunderstandings and error at Mr. Morehouse's trial concerning 
impeachment of a defendant through a previous criminal record (R. 
122-23). The motion for a new trial was heard and denied by Judge 
Russon (R. 1147). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On appeal, Mr. Morehouse contends that the State failed to 
present sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. The State's 
expert witnesses disagreed on the causes of the first fire and 
admitted that some of the physical evidence was consistent with an 
accidental as well as an intentional burning. Further, the State 
failed to prove that Mr. Morehouse was responsible for set the 
fire. 
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Additionally, the Appellant asserts that his constitutional 
right to effective assistance of counsel was abridged by his 
attorney's deficient performance. Counsel for the defense failed to 
challenge illegally obtained evidence and failed to understand and 
apply Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence with respect to Mr. 
Morehouse's previous felony convictions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF GUILTY OF AGGRAVATED ARSON. 
James Morehouse was convicted of aggravated arson in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-103 (1986 Supp.). Mr. Morehouse 
contends that, even when stretched to its reasonable limits, the 
evidence was insufficient to establish that he "intentionally and 
unlawfully" damaged a "habitable structure". 
The power of this Court is review the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting a guilty verdict is well established. In a 
recent decision from the Utah Supreme Court, State v. Hill, 44 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 23 (1986) the Court reaffirmed its position by noting: 
"While it is not the function of this Court to substitute 
its judgment for that of the jury, we will reverse a 
conviction if the evidence is so unsubstantial or 
inconclusive that reasonable minds must necessarily 
entertain a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's guilt." 
State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 148-49 (Utah 1983); State v. 
Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976). 
State v. Hill, 44 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 24 (1986). 
Section 76-6-103 Utah Code Ann. (1986 Supp.) defines 
aggravated arson as follows: 
76-6-103. Aggravated arson.—(1) A person is 
guilty of aggravated arson if by means of fire or 
explosives he intentionally and unlawfully 
damages: 
(a) A habitable structure; or 
(b) Any structure or vehicle when any person not 
a participant in the offense is in the structure 
or vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the second 
degree. 
In the present case, the Appellant first contends that the 
State failed to prove that the gas station was "intentionally" 
damaged by fire or explosives, and furthermore the Statefs evidence 
was insufficient to prove that James Morehouse had committed a crime. 
At trial, the State presented the testimony of Fred 
Mauerman, a lieutenant for the Salt Lake Fire Department who was in 
charge of the crew at both fires on November 1st, 1985. Mr. 
Mauerman concluded that the first fire was an electrical fire (R. 
212) and that the subsequent fire involved flammable liquids (R. 
219), fairly common substances at a garage or gas station. 
The State also called Capt. William Memmott, an origin and 
cause specialist with the Salt Lake Fire Department (at the time of 
the fire a lieutenant). Mr. Memmott testified that he found burn 
patterns indicating the second fire had four points of origin, an 
"indication" to him that the fire was "intentionally set" (R. 321). 
Mr. Memmott also concluded, after testing samples taken from the gas 
station on November 4, that the flammable liquid involved in the 
fire was gasoline (R. 307). In addition, he testified that the 
first fire was caused by "flammable liquid being poured and set on 
fire" (R. 321), that the fire was "intentional", and that there was 
no connection between the first and second fire (R. 322). Later, 
Mr. Memmott agreed that a flammable liquid accidentally spilled in 
the attic would have created a spill pattern "similar to someone 
pouring something up there." (R. 361). 
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Mr. Mclff, an investigator for the fire department and a 
witness for the State, testified that the fire was intentionally set 
based on his observations that the electrical system did not cause 
the fire (R. 565-67), and the burn patterns found at the scene which 
were consistent with a pouring pattern, Mr, Mclff also agreed 
however that there were indications that the fire was accidentally 
set (R. 571). 
The inconsistencies and uncertainties between the 
prosecution's own witnesses indicate the lack of evidence and the 
guesswork relied on by the State to establish an intentional 
burning. Aggravated arson requires that the actor "intentionally" 
burn a habitable structure. While testimony from Mr. Memmott and 
Mr. Mclff indicated the burn patterns were consistent with an 
"intentional" burning (R. 321-22), both conceded that the fire could 
have been due to accidental causes (R. 361, 571). In State v. Hill, 
supra, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Where the only evidence presented against a 
defendant is circumstantial, the evidence 
supporting a conviction must preclude every 
reasonable hypothesis of innocence. This is 
because the existence of a reasonable hypothesis 
of innocence necessarily raises a reasonable 
doubt as to the defendant's guilt. 
44 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24 (citation ommitted). 
Applied to the facts of this case, the State presented 
minimal evidence consisting largely of conflicting opinions from its 
own experts, of an intentional burning. According to these same 
experts, the fire could have been accidental, a hypothesis 
consistent with innocence not precluded by the State. 
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Assuming, arguendo, that the fire was intentionally set, 
the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove that Mr. Morehouse 
was the responsible party. At trial, the State established that the 
first fire was reported at 8:09 p.m. and that Mr. Morehouse's two 
alibi witnesses were inconsistant as to the exact time the defendant 
left the Batters Up Club where he had stopped after locking up the 
station. Speaking of the incident which had occurred five months 
earlier, Howard Arbulkle testified that Mr. Morehouse had left the 
club sometime between 7:00-7:30 (R. 618), while Herbert Smith 
testified that defendant left sometime between 8:00 p.m. and 8:30 
p.m. in order to meet his wife at home by 9:00 p.m. (R. 656-66). 
The State failed to contact a third alibi witness for Mr. Morehouse 
(R. 460). The police could not establish how long the first fire 
had been burning thus the time discrepancies lend nothing to the 
State's cases (R. 460). Additionally, when questioned on the 
evening of the fire Mr. Morehouse told Detective Clegg that he left 
the Batters Up Club between 8:15 and 8:30. 
With respect to the second fire, Mr. Morehouse placed a car 
at the scene seconds before the blaze flared up again and was able 
to provide police with the license number of a vehicle which had 
been stolen and involved in other criminal activity on the evening 
in question. (R. 444, 456). Mrs. Slattery, a woman living near the 
station also saw a car and an unidentified individual drive off 
moments before the flames were visible in the windows of the gas 
station (R. 628). This evidence was unrefuted by the State. 
Finally, Larry Beaslin, Mr. Morehouse's insurance agent 
testified that Mr. Morehouse had a $10,000 "garage keepers policy" 
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covering contents of the garage and liability to cover customers1 
cars (R. 496), with a $100 deductible (R. 674). He testified Mr. 
Morehouse contacted him about the fire the morning of November 
fourth, as required by the policy (R. 503). Mr. Morehouse indicated 
that the damage was around $200 (R. 499). Mr. Beaslin testified 
that Mr. Morehouse contacted him one day later, November fifth, 
after deciding that the claim was too minor to pursue (R. 504). 
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the 
State was insufficient to establish the guilt of Mr. Morehouse. The 
Utah Supreme Court recently addressed the "insufficiency of 
evidence" argument in State v. Hill, supra. In Hill, the defendants 
had visited an antique store that was burglarized later that same 
evening. Some of the merchandise stolen from the store was found, 
along with a bill of sale, in the defendants1 possession. In 
reversing the jury conviction for burglary and second degree theft, 
the Court held that the prosecution must preclude every reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence because a reasonable hypothesis of innocence 
necessarily raises a reasonable doubt as to guilt. Id. at 24. 
The evidence against Mr. Morehouse was inherently 
insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
State relied on the fact that Mr. Morehouse's alibi witnesses 
disagreed as to the time he left the Batters Up Club, and his 
failure to establish his whereabouts from 7:30 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., 
the time at which the State concluded the first fire was set. 
However, the State bears the burden of proof and Mr. Morehouses' 
failure to establish the exact time he left the bar is insufficient 
to prove that he was at the station and started the fire. 
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With respect to the second fire the State relies on Mr. 
Morehouse's presence at the station, the fact that he was seen 
coming out of the building shortly before the fire broke out, his 
inconsistent statements concerning the arrival time of the 
suspicious car at the station, and the fact that he filed and 
cancelled an insurance claim. Viewed individually or considered 
together these circumstantial factors are insufficient to convict 
Mr. Morehouse of intentionally burning the station. 
In this case, the State appears to have engaged in a 
"process of elimination11 in charging the appellant. For example, 
the evidence relied on by the State could raise equally serious 
doubts about the role of the owner of the building in the incident. 
The owner, Mr. Regan, was notified at his home in Holladay, of the 
fire around 8:30 p.m. (R. 582). He testified that he immediately 
called Mr. Morehouse (R. 582), but received no answer. Mr. Regan 
then testified that he waited 30-45 minutes (R. 583), and received 
an answer on the second call, about 8:30 or 8:40 (R. 583). Clearly, 
a discrepancy exists on the times involved. Although Mr. Regan's 
home was approximately 18 minutes from the station (R. 607) he did 
not arrive at the station until 9:20 (R. 602). His whereabouts 
before that time were unconfirmed (R. 602). On cross-examination 
Mr. Regan testified that he had been loosing money on the gas 
station since he had purchased it (R. 602), and that he had tried to 
collect on Mr. Morehouse's insurance (R. 396) for the extensive 
damage to the structure (R. 591), none of which was covered by the 
insurance policy negotiated by Mr. Morehouse. Finally, while Mr. 
Regan testified that he did not have a key to the building (R. 601), 
he had gained access before due to a weak lock (R. 601). 
The State failed to establish that the station was 
intentionally burned and further failed to prove that Mr. Morehouse 
was the person responsible for the burning of the structure. As 
previously noted, the State's expert witnesses were inconsistent on 
the cause of the first fire, and a suspicious vehicle was identified 
at the gas station seconds before the second fire. The evidence 
presented by the State was so circumstantial that any number of 
individuals could have been implicated. All of the facts indicate 
that the defendant had several reasonable hypotheses consistent with 
innocence and the State's circumstantial evidence was insufficient 
to establish the guilt of the defendant. Therefore, Mr. Morehouse 
respectfully requests that his conviction be reversed. 
POINT II. MR. MOREHOUSE WAS DENIED HIS SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
A. COUNSEL FAILED TO CHALLENGE THE ADMISSION OF 
EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN A WARRANTLESS SEARCH. 
At trial, several fire and police investigators testified 
concerning evidence obtained at the scene of the fire, the garage 
leased and operated by Mr. Morehouse. Captain Memmott testified 
that he took two rolls of photographs of the building the night of 
the fire, a roll the morning after the fire, and another roll three 
days after the fire (R. 322). Captain Memmott also testified that 
he obtained samples from around the premises but failed to note when 
and where the samples were taken (R. 353). He indicated one sample 
went to the State Crime lab on November fourth (R. 308), three days 
after the fire, on the same day he returned to the premises to take 
pictures. Mr. Mclff, an investigator for the Salt Lake County Fire 
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Department, testified that Capt. Memmott called him to the scene of 
the fire around 7:00 or 8:00 a.m. the morning after the fire (R. 
563), and the ensuing investigation lasted two and a half hours (R. 
564). Thus, while investigators entered the premises numerous times 
following the fire there was no indication that these "searches" 
were conducted pursuant to a search warrant. Further, Mr. Morehouse 
did not consent to the searches. (Addendum A). However, 
Mr.Morehouse's counsel failed to challenge the evidence "obtained 
from the warrantless intrusions." 
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
effective assistance of counsel in two companion cases, United 
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) and Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Cronic, the Court emphasized that effective 
advocacy is the pillar upon which our system of justice is founded. 
Without effective advocacy, the Court stated the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee to a fair trial suffers. 
In Strickland v. Washington, the Court established a two 
prong test for analysis of the effectiveness of counsel. First, the 
Court required the defendant to show a deficiency in counsel's 
performance. The Court defined "deficient performance" as that 
falling below an "objective" standard of reasonableness. The second 
prong of the Strickland test requires a defendant to show the 
deficiency prejudiced the defense. To establish prejudice, "the 
defendant must show that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
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The Utah Supreme Court's rulings on ineffectiveness of 
counsel have been consistent with Cronic and Strickland, In State 
v, McNicol, 534 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976), the Utah Court reaffirmed 
a previous holding when it stated, 
[T]he right of the accused to have counsel is not 
satisfied by a sham or pretense of an appearance 
in the record by an attorney who manifests no 
real concern about the interests of the accused. 
He is entitled to the assistance of a competent 
member of the Bar, who shows a willingness to 
identify himself with the interests of the 
accused and present such defenses as are 
available under the law and consistent with the 
ethics of the profession, (footnotes omitted). 
Consistent with Strickland, the Utah Supreme Court, in 
State v. Lairby, 669 P.2d 1187, 1203 (Utah 1984) held, that in 
reviewing the effectiveness of counsel argument the following 
factors should be considered: 
(1) the burden of establishing inadequate 
representation is on the defendant, and proof of 
such must be a demonstrable reality and not a 
speculative matter. 
(2) A lawyer's legitimate exercise of judgment 
in the choice of trial strategy or tactics that 
did not produce the anticipated result does not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(3) It must appear that any deficiency in the 
performance of counsel was prejudicial, 
(citations omitted) 
In State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979) prejudice was 
defined as a reasonable likelihood that without counsel's error, a 
different result would have occurred. Jjd. at 920. According to the 
Utah Supreme Court in Lairby, this standard is higher than the 
standard of Strickland but the Utah Court stated it would "defer to 
the federal standard for prejudice where a defendant claims a sixth 
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel has been 
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violated." Lairby, 699 P.2d at 1205. Thus, the Utah Court seems to 
require a reasonable probability that but for the defense counsel's 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In the present case, performance by counsel for the defense 
was first deficient because of the failure to object to the 
admission of evidence obtained in a warrantless search. In Michigan 
v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), the United States Supreme Court found 
investigatory entries made by the police following a fire to be 
unconstitutional without a warrant. The factual situation of Tyler 
was similar to the case at bar. A midnight fire occurred at a 
furniture store. While the fire was still being extinguished fire 
and police personnel conducted an investigation until smoke and 
darkness forced abandonment of the building. Early the next morning 
the investigation was completed. Entries were also made in the 
weeks preceding the trial. Responding to defendant's argument that 
the evidence taken during these investigations was inadmissible as 
fruit of an illegal search the Court concluded that because of the 
emergency situation the fire department did not need a warrant for 
the initial entry to fight a fire. Tyler at 509. Similarly, 
because the trial investigation was aborted due to smoke, the Court 
held that the entry the following morning was a continuation of the 
first, thus a warrant was unnecessary. Id. at 511. However, the 
evidence obtained in warrantless investigations made days and even 
weeks after the fire was inadmissible because such entries were 
detached from the exigency of the fire and traditional search 
requirements were in effect. Id. 
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Applying Tyler to the facts of this case demonstrates that 
some of the evidence obtained by Captain Memmott, including the 
pictures, taken three days after the fire should have been 
inadmissible. Additionally, because Captain Memmott failed to keep 
accurate records of when and where he obtained each piece of 
evidence (R. 322, 353), it is uncertain which exhibits and evidence 
were products of a warrantless "search". Thus, those that could not 
be identified specifically with a date and location should have been 
suppressed along with the conclusions reached by Captain Memmott (R. 
298, 350) which were based on the illegally obtained evidence. Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963). 
A more recent United States Supreme Court decision, 
Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984), also involved the 
constitutionality of administrative searches on fire-damaged 
property. In Clifford, the fire department responded to a fire at 
5:40 a.m. By 7:00 a.m. the fire was extinguished and all fire 
department and police personnel had left the scene. At 8:00 a.m. an 
investigator for the fire department was assigned to the case. He 
arrived on the premises around 1:00 p.m. and proceeded to look for 
evidence. Id. at 293. The Court listed a variety of factors in 
concluding that entries made subsequent to the exigent circumstances 
of the fire were warrantless nonconsensual "searches" in violation 
of defendant's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights: 
[W]hether there are legitimate privacy interests 
in the fire damaged property that are protected 
by the Fourth Amendment; whether exigent 
circumstances justify the government intrusion 
regardless of any reasonable expectations of 
privacy; and whether the object of the search is 
to determine the cause of the fire or to gather 
evidence of criminal activity. 
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Id, at 292. The Court noted that between the time of the fire and 
the investigation the defendant had taken steps to secure his 
privacy by boarding up the house, thus the subsequent entry by fire 
department personnel was not a continuation of the earlier entry 
pursuant to the emergency of the fire but was made without a warrant 
in violation of defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. 
at 296. According to the Court, privacy expectations varied with 
the type of property, the amount of damage, the prior and continued 
use of the premises and, in some cases, the ownerfs efforts to 
secure it against intruders. Id. at 292. 
Applying the Clifford factors to this case, a reasonable 
conclusion is that the intrusions subsequent to the exigencies of 
the fire at the service station, were violations of Mr. Morehousefs 
reasonable expectation of privacy. The premises had been secured 
following the fire. The doors were locked, the hole in the bay door 
had been blocked with the dumpster (R. 214) and Mr. Morehouse had 
arranged to have Mr. Molise spend the night on the premises (R. 
525-26). While the building was commercial, it had not been 
seriously damaged (R. 256, 262) and Mr. Morehouse started cleaning 
up immediately and continued to use the premises (R. 539). The 
entry effectuated to investigate and take pictures three days 
following the fire was a search because of the time span from the 
initial entry. As the Supreme Court stated in Clifford: 
Where, . . ., reasonable expectation of privacy 
remain in the fire damaged property, additional 
investigations begun after the fire and police 
officials have left the scene generally must be 
made pursuant to a warrant on the identification 
of some new exigency. 
464 U.S. at 293. 
Unlike the situation in Tyler, nothing indicates that Mr. 
Memmott was forced to cease his preliminary investigation following 
the fire because of smoke. Further the Utah Supreme Court has 
previously held that leased premises are within the protection of 
the Fourth Amendment and consent of the landlord is insufficient to 
justify a warrantless search of lessee's premises. State v. Kent, 
432 P.2d 64 (Utah 1967). Mr. Morehouse did not consent to the 
search (See Addendum A), and as lessee, he was the only individual 
who could consent to such a search. 
Counsel's failure to challenge the admission of the 
illegally obtained evidence constituted a deficiency in 
representation. The pictures were relied on almost exclusively by 
the State's expert witness, Captain Memmott, and from them he drew 
many conclusions. Captain Memmott admitted that only one roll of 
film was taken the night of the fire (R. 322) and that the other two 
rolls of film and the lab samples were taken during subsequent 
investigatory searches of the station (R. 322, 353) made without a 
warrant or Mr. Morehouse's permission. According to Tyler and 
Clifford such evidence is inadmissible, and Wong Sun establishes 
that conclusions based on illegally obtained evidence are also 
inadmissible. However, Mr. Verhoef failed to challenge the 
evidence. Under Strickland, the deficiency was prejudicial because, 
based on the strong precedent in the area of illegally obtained 
evidence, there existed a reasonable likelihood that absent 
counsel's omission some of the evidence would have been suppressed. 
Without the suppressed evidence, the fire investigators may not have 
been able to reach the opinion that the fire was arson-caused. Thus 
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the prosecution could not have established the corpus delicti of a 
crime. Even if the opinion of the investigators could have been 
admitted without the evidence in question, suppression of some of 
the physical evidence could have led to a different outcome in this 
admittedly close case (R. 1111). Because of this deficiency of 
performance, Appellant's conviction should be reversed. 
B. DEFENDANT'S CASE WAS PREJUDICED BECAUSE COUNSEL FAILED 
TO MOVE FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF MR. MOREHOUSE'S PREVIOUS 
FELONY CONVICTIONS UNDER RULE 609 OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF EVIDENCE. 
Mr. Morehouse's attorney, Mr. Verhoef, filed a Motion for a 
New Trial on April 21, 1986 (R. 122). The motion was based on Mr. 
Verhoef's belief that a Utah Supreme Court decision, State v. 
Banner, narrowed the application of the rule of evidence allowing 
impeachment of a criminal defendant by prior felony convictions. 
(Addendum B). In a hearing on the motion on May 2, 1986, Mr. 
Verhoef testified that he assumed Mr. Morehouse could be 
cross-examined on all prior felony convictions and on this basis he 
prohibited Mr. Morehouse from testifying in his own behalf at trial 
(R. 1084-85). Thus, Mr. Verhoef failed to investigate any motions 
limiting examination of Mr. Morehouse's prior convictions (R. 1109) 
even though his client expressed, at their first meeting, his desire 
to testify on his own behalf (R. 1109). Mr. Verhoef was ineffective 
as counsel because he failed to apply Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
The Utah Supreme Court adopted the rules April 13, 1983, 
with an effective date of September 1, 1983. As adopted, Rule 609 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that a witness must answer 
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questions concerning prior convictions within a ten year period if 
the previous crime involved dishonesty or if the "crime was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year" and the 
trial court determines probative value of the evidence outweighs the 
prejudicial effect. Additionally, if the date of conviction or 
release from confinement is more than ten years old the evidence is 
inadmissible absent a special finding by the court and notice to the 
adverse party. (See Addendum C). 
As adopted, Rule 609 conflicted with §78-24-9 Utah Code 
Ann. (1953) which allowed a witness to be cross-examined on any 
previous felony conviction. (See Addendum D). While State v. 
Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986) was the first Utah case to declare 
Rule 609 inconsistent with §78-24-9, the conclusion that Rule 609 
superseded the conflicting statute was statutorially established, 
and is specifically stated in the Preliminary Committee note preface 
to the Utah Rules of Evidence which declares "any existing statutes 
inconsistent with these rules, if and when these rules are adopted 
by the Supreme Court, will be impliedly repealed." Utah Code Ann. 
Vol. 9B (Supp. 1986). Further the Court pointed out in Banner, 717 
P.2d at 1333, §78-2-4 of the Utah Code Ann. (See Addendum E) makes 
it clear that the Utah Supreme Court has the authority to adopt new 
rules of evidence. Existing inconsistent laws must yield to new 
promulgations as long as the new statutes do not modify or change 
substantive rights. Utah Code Ann. §78-2-4 (Supp. 1986) Thus, Mr. 
Verhoef's performance was deficient because he failed to know the 
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Utah Rules of Evidence, three years after the Rules were adopted in 
Utah. Mr. Verhoef's deficiency effectively kept Mr. Morehouse from 
testifying on his own behalf.1 
Applying the Strickland standard to the performance of 
counsel in this case, Mr.Verhoef's decision to keep Mr. Morehouse 
from testifying was not a tactical decision but was based on his 
misunderstanding that §78-24-9 of the Utah Code Ann. would have 
allowed the prosecution to examine any witness as to previous felony 
convictions (R. 1084-85). The misunderstanding was prejudicial to 
Mr. Morehouse because it was serious enough to deprive Mr. Morehouse 
of a fair trial. The correct application of Rule 609 would have 
allowed Mr. Verhoef to move for the limitation of examination 
concerning the appellant's previous felonies. A favorable ruling on 
the motion would have enabled Mr. Morehouse to testify in his own 
behalf, and based on the lack of evidence at trial, there was a 
reasonable likelihood that there would have been a different 
result.2 
Testimony established that this was a close case (R. 1111) 
and while a jury verdict is usually unimpeachable, arguably, the 
1 While Utah has operated under the Utah Rules of Evidence since 
1983, federal courts have operated under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence since 1975. Numerous federal courts have interpreted Rule 
609. See United States v. Smith, 551 F. 2d 348 (D.C.Cir. 1976); 
Government of Virgin Islands v. Testamark, 528 F.2d 742 (3rd Cir. 
1976). 
2
 While the record indicates the judge would have allowed 
cross-examination on Mr. Morehouse's previous felonies (R. 1137-38, 
1140-1147), the informal post-trial decision was based on inaccurate 
information as to the dates and previous felonies, (R. 1135, 1147) 
and had no binding judicial effect. Additionally, briefing of the 
issue would have provided contradictory precedent for Judge Russon's 
decision and may have lead to a different conclusion. 
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defendant's failure to testify can be determinative in a close case 
in spite of the jury instructions to the contrary. Mr. Verhoef 
testified that he believed there were some gaps in the case he 
presented that could have been filled by Mr. Morehouse's testimony 
(R. 1118-1120) and that the appellant's failure to testify weighed 
heavily on the jury (R. 1121). Because the case was so close, and 
because the evidence against Mr. Morehouse was minimal, prejudice is 
more easily established. According to Strickland, "a verdict or 
conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to 
have been affected by errors than one with over whelming record 
support." 466 U.S. 668, 696. 
Furthermore, another line of cases suggests that where 
ineffective assistance of counsel deprives defendant of his right to 
testify the resulting prejudice is to be presumed. United States v. 
Butts, 630 F. Supp. 1145 (D. Me. 1986). In Butts, counsel, acting 
on the belief that the defendant would be impeached by his prior 
felony convictions, effectively kept the defendant from testifying. 
In granting the defendant's motion for a new trial the court refused 
to apply the second prong of the Strickland test and held: 
This Court is satisfied that ineffective 
assistance of counsel which results in a 
deprivation of the defendant's right to testify 
transcends conventional Sixth Amendment analysis 
and that prejudice is sufficiently proven, if not 
to be presumed from, the resulting denial of the 
defendant's right to testify. 
Id. at 1149. The United States Supreme Court has "assumed" that the 
accused has a right to testify in his own behalf, See Nix v. 
Whiteside, U.S. , 89 L.Ed. 2d 123, 138 (1986). The 
facts of the present case seem to indicate that Mr. Verhoefs 
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ineffective assistance of counsel prevented appellant from 
testifying. "Where the very point of a trial is to determine 
whether an individual was involved in criminal activity, the 
testimony of the individual himself must be considered of prime 
importance." Butts at 1147. Prejudice must be presumed because Mr. 
Morehouse was not allowed to testify. 
Under Strickland, a reasonable defense attorney would have 
known the Utah Rules of Evidence that had been in effect for three 
years. Mr. Verhoef's conduct fell below the objective standard of 
practice and constituted a deficiency. The appellant was prejudiced 
by the deficiency because he was denied the right to testify in his 
own behalf and in such a close case there was a reasonable 
likelihood his testimony would have resulted in a different 
verdict. Applying Butts, prejudice would be presumed. Thus under 
either standard Mr. Morehouse was prejudiced as a result of Mr. 
Verhoef's deficient performance and the conviction based on the 
deficiency should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the state's inability to prove an intentional 
burning and to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of Mr. Morehouse 
innocence and because defense counsel's performance was deficient in 
two areas which prejudiced the appellant's case, the Appellant, 
James Morehouse, respectfully petitions this Court to reverse his 
conviction and remand this case to the district court for either a 
new trial or dismissal of the charges. 
a fit 
Respectfully submitted this /^• day of February, 1987. 
CURTIS C. NESSET 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
^e^^/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CURTIS C. NESSET, hereby certify that four copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Brief will be devliered to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
84114, this / 9 — day of February, 1987. 
CURTIS C. NESSET 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
DELIVERED by this 
day of February, 1987. 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
v. 
JAMES ACE MOREHOUSE, 
Defendant/Appellant 
AFFIDAVIT OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 860193CA 
I, JAMES ACE MOREHOUSE, being first duly sworn, according 
to law, on my oath, depose and say: 
1. I am the defendant/appellant in the above-entitled case. 
2. I was the lessee of the property involved in the 
alleged arson in this case. 
3. At no time during the investigation of the alleged 
arson by the police and fire departments did I give my consent for 
their entry onto that leased property. 
DATED this p.£k day of February, 1987. 
•7 
JAMES ACE MOREHJOUSE" ' ' 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO/before me t h i s ) 2Ai\ day of 
F e b r u a r y , 1987 . 
NOTARY PUBLIC ~J 
R e s i d i n g in fonjjk ^.kx (~V^,,.v-e 




























MARTIN VERHOEF, #3326 
Attorney for Defendant 
255 East 400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-8998 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
JAMES ACE MOREHOUSE, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case No. CR-86-257 
The defendant above-named, by and through his counsel of 
record, and pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure hereby moves the Court to grant the named defendant a 
new trial in the interest of justice upon the grounds and for the 
reasons set forth below: 
1. This matter was tried before a jury, and the 
defendant sentenced on the 14th day of April, 1986. 
2. On the 14th day of April, 1986, the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah in Case No. 20371 captioned The State of Utah v^ 
[Nicholas Banner applied a rule which, in the opinion of counsel, 
is a substantial deviation to the rule existing previously in that 
the impeachment of a defendant who testifies at his trial in a 
criminal case by use of prior felony convictions would now be more 


























3. Counsel's sole and substantial reason for not 
calling defendant to the stand to testify in his own behalf was 
based solely upon the existence of a prior criminal history of the 
defendant. The undersigned would have called the defendant to the 
stand in light of the Utah Supreme Court's holding in the Banner 
case. 
4. The undersigned believes that the issues of fact 
were very close indeed and that defendant's failure to testify 
substantially affected the verdict of the jury. 
For the reasons set forth above, the defendant should be 
accorded a new trial or such other relief as the Court deems 
appropriate. 
Dated this 3 / day of April, 1986. 
S7 
^ ''
 r/> /S /.^/ 
MARTIN VERHOEF
 L 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby c e r t i f y that I m a i l e d a copy of the forego ing 
Motion for New Tr ia l , postage prepaid, to Ernest W. Jones, Deputy 
County At torney , 231 East 400 South, S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111, 
and the a t t o r n e y to be a s s i g n e d at t h e L e g a l D e f e n d e r ' s 
A s s o c i a t i o n , 333 South 200 East , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 t h i s 
c £ / ^ d a y of Apri l , 1986. 
Au<^4* f). ^jkc/hi-^t 
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ADDENDUM C 
RULE 609 
IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF CONVICTION OF CRIME 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evi-
dence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or 
established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which 
he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this 
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty 
or false statement, regardless of the punishment. 
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period 
of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of 
the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later 
date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value 
of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs 
its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as 
calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party 
sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse 
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence. 
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence of a 
conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject of 
a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based 
on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has not been 
convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by death or imprisonment in 
excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, 
or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence. 
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not 
admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence 
of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction of the of-
fense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied 
that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or 
innocence. 
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render 
evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admis-
sible. 
Committee Note to Rule 609. The pendency of an appeal does not render a 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and conviction inadmissible. This is in accord with 
changes Utah law by granting the court dis- U t a h case law. State v. Crawford, 60 Utah 6, 
cretion in convictions not involving dishonesty 206 Pac. 717 (1922). 
or false statement to refuse to admit the evi- r » — r>~p«™™-
dence if it would be prejudicial to the defen- Cross-References. 
dant. Current Utah law mandates the admis- Felony conviction, witness must answer as 
sion of such evidence. State v. Bennett, 30 t o fact °^ 78-24-9. 
Utah 2d 343, 517 P.2d 1029 (1973); State v Traffic conviction not affecting credibility as 
Van Dam, 554 P.2d 1324 (Utah 1976); State v. witness, 41-6-171. 
McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980). 
There is presently no provision in Utah law 
similar to subsection (d). 
ADDENDUM D 
78-24-9. Duty to answer questions—Privilege.—A witness must answer 
questions legal and pertinent to the matter in issue, although his answer 
may establish a claim against himself; but he need not give an answer 
which will have a tendency to subject him to punishment for a felony; 
nor need he give an answer which will have a direct tendency to degrade 
his character, unless it is to the very fact in issue or to a fact from which 
the fact in issue would be presumed. But a witness must answer as to 
the fact of his previous conviction of felony. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, §1; 0. 1943, P r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t self-incrimination, 
Supp., 104-24-9. Const. Art. I, §12; Rules of Evidence, 
Rule 25. Compiler's Notes. 
Tnis section is nearly identical to former Construction and application of section, 
section 104-49-20 (Code 1943) which was "Pertinent to the matter in issue," as 
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. used in predecessor section relative to 
questions witness must answer, included 
Cross-References. those collateral matters, if any, in regard 
Cross-examination of defendant, 77-44-5. to which witness might be examined to 
ADDENDUM E 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tem-
pore, and practice of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence for 
use in the courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate pro-
cess. The Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and evidence 
adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of 
both houses of the Legislature. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution, the Supreme 
Court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and judges pro 
tempore to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be citizens 
of the United States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of law, includ-
ing admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline of persons 
admitted to the practice of law. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2-4, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 42. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1986, ch. 47, 
§ 42 repeals § 78-2-4, as enacted by Laws 
1951, ch. 58, § 1, pertaining to rulemaking 
powers of Supreme Court, and enacts the 
above section. 
Law Reviews. — Utah Rules of Evidence 
1983,1985 Utah L. Rev. 63,64. 
